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With Ohio considering passing the nation’s second ban on 
abortions motivated by Down Syndrome, the relationship between 
abortion and disability law has taken on new importance. Disability-
based bans raise unique legal, moral, and political difficulties for those 
supporting legal abortion. The core commitments supporting legal 
abortion—including sex equality—stand in some tension with justifying 
abortion in the case of a fetal defect or disability.  
Given the problems with disability-based bans, it may seem that 
there is no urgent need to resolve these tensions. Disability-based 
statutes likely create an impermissible undue burden under Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern v. Casey and seem impossible to enforce. 
However, historical analysis shows that the bans under consideration 
may transform the abortion debate even if they are never enforced. 
First, this history explains the puzzling lack of discussion of 
disability in abortion politics, illuminating the political payoff of 
disability-based justifications used by activists otherwise committed to 
equal treatment. Second, this history makes clear the perils that a 
disability-based ban creates for supporters of legal abortion. Raising the 
salience of “selective” abortion may allow pro-lifers to win over 
ambivalent voters and legislators who are concerned about disability 
discrimination. Moreover, the arguments made prominent by such a law 
can easily justify other restrictions that might fare better in the courts, 
including limitations on access to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis 
and prohibitions on abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy. 
To avoid the danger illuminated by the history studied here, pro-
choice attorneys and legislators should push for laws that actually 
reduce the odds of disability-based abortion. Ironically, parents who 
might not otherwise choose to terminate a pregnancy in the case of 
disability do so because they feel they have no choice, particularly given 
the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled adults confronting both 
poverty and unemployment. Reproductive justice should include a 
commitment to adequate funding for the programs on which disabled 
adults and children depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal 
incentives that discourage disabled Americans from taking steps that 
would make employment more realistic. Guaranteeing meaningful 
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choices inevitably involves the removal of the discrimination and 
tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in cases of fetal 




After Indiana passed the second law in the country banning abortions on the 
basis of certain fetal disabilities, the relationship between abortion and disability 
law took on new importance.1 Disability-based bans raise unique legal, moral, and 
political difficulties for those supporting legal abortion.2 The core commitments 
																																								 																				
1 On the passage of the Indiana law, see, for example, Danielle Paquette, Doctors 
Respond to Indiana Banning Abortions Because of Down Syndrome, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/25/doctors-respond-
to-indiana-banning-abortions-because-of-down-syndrome/?utm_term=.99f13440cf59 
[https://perma.cc/858D-KN53]. A federal judge subsequently blocked enforcement of the 
law on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm & Mitch Smith, Federal Judge 
Blocks Indiana Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
07/01/us/federal-judge-blocks-indiana-abortion-law.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2A9F-
BT8P] (suggesting it was an “illegal limit on a woman’s long-established constitutional 
right”). Ohio considered this, but ultimately did not pass a similar measure. See, e.g., 
Martin Pengelly, John Kasich Pledges to Sign Bill Banning Abortions Due to Down’s 
Diagnosis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/ 
sep/20/john-kasich-ohio-abortion-bill-downs-syndrome [https://perma.cc/P6TV-DHNM] 
(“Kasich has said he will sign a state bill currently under debate that would ban abortions 
carried out because a child has Down’s syndrome.”); V.v.B., Ohio’s Controversial 
Abortion Bill, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/demo 
cracyinamerica/2015/08/down-syndrome [https://perma.cc/V9YU-YMG3] (“Ohio 
lawmakers are expected to approve a measure that would ban doctors from performing an 
abortion if the patient wants to avoid giving birth to a child with Down syndrome.”). For 
the North Dakota law already in effect, see, for example, Associated Press, National 
Digest: N.D. Limits Abortions: Ind. Upholds School Voucher Program, WASH. POST (Mar. 
26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/national-digest-nd-limits-abortions-
ind-upholds-school-voucher-program/2013/03/26/efd82ea8-964f-11e2-8b4e-0b56f26f28de 
_story.html?utm_term=.c09c29239a28 [hereinafter National Digest] [https://perma.cc/RD3
X-FJBK]; Liz Szabo, Earlier Prenatal Tests Usher in “Heartbreaking” Decisions: 
Advocates for Those with Down Syndrome Tell the World Theses Lives Are Worth Living, 
USA TODAY, May 2, 2013, at 1A; James MacPherson, Judge Blocks “Invalid” N.D. 
Abortion Law, BOS. GLOBE (July 23, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/ 
2013/07/22/federal-judge-delays-north-dakota-abortion-law/ZSVH9J92WKYEeIDz9ei1B 
M/story.html [https://perma.cc/DQE5-ZX4S].  
2 See, e.g., Sonia Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other 
Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1564 (2008) (“Prenatal testing and PIGD therefore present a 
dilemma if we want to understand reproductive rights in terms of equality.”); Maya 
Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on 
Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 75, 104–05 (2013) (treating disability discrimination as 
a legitimate concern but concluding that existing antiabortion laws did little to protect the 
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supporting legal abortion—including sex equality—stand in some tension with 
justifying abortion in the case of a fetal defect or disability.  
Given the problems with disability-based bans, it may seem that there is no 
urgent need to resolve these tensions. Disability-based statutes likely create an 
impermissible undue burden under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey3 and seem impossible to enforce. However, historical 
analysis shows that the bans under consideration may transform the abortion 
debate even if they are never enforced. 
First, this history explains the puzzling lack of discussion of disability in 
abortion politics, illuminating the political payoff of disability-based justifications 
used by activists otherwise committed to equal treatment. Second, this history 
makes clear the perils that a disability-based ban creates for supporters of legal 
abortion. Raising the salience of “selective” abortion may allow pro-lifers to win 
over ambivalent voters and legislators who are concerned about disability 
discrimination. Moreover, the arguments made prominent by such a law can easily 
justify other restrictions that might fare better in the courts, including limitations 
on access to noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis and prohibitions on abortion 
after the 20th week of pregnancy.  
To avoid the danger illuminated by the history studied here, pro-choice 
attorneys and legislators should push for laws that actually reduce the odds of 
disability-based abortions. Ironically, parents who might not otherwise choose to 
terminate a pregnancy in the case of disability do so because they feel they have no 
choice, particularly given the bleak outcomes faced by many disabled adults, such 
as poverty and unemployment. Reproductive justice should include a commitment 
to adequate funding for the programs on which disabled adults and children 
depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal incentives that discourage 
disabled Americans from taking steps that would make employment more realistic. 
Guaranteeing meaningful choices inevitably involves the removal of the 
discrimination and tangible obstacles that make abortion more common in cases of 
fetal defect or disability. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the legal and political 
history of abortion and disability starting in the 1960s. Part II places the new wave 
of antiabortion laws in historical context and explains why they do nothing to 
resolve the tension between legal abortion and disability rights. Part III identifies 
several legal proposals that would help remove some of the reasons that disability 
still prompts some parents to seek abortion, and Part IV concludes the discussion. 
 
																																								 																				
disabled); Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating 
Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 73–
74 (2012) (proposing an intermediate scrutiny test for restrictions on access to noninvasive 
prenatal genetic diagnosis in recognition of the fact that “the collective result of individual 
reproductive decisions has the potential to create significant discrimination and societal 
harm”). 
3 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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I.  DISABILITY AND ABORTION IN LEGAL HISTORY 
 
In the early 1970s, in explaining the progress of the campaign to legalize 
abortion, Harriet Pilpel of Planned Parenthood argued that a rise in birth defects 
had “brought home to the American public the scope, complexity and immediacy 
of the [abortion] question.”4 As Pilpel recognized, disability politics had helped to 
turn the repeal of abortion restrictions into a pressing political question. 
Thalidomide, a drug used to control morning sickness, caused fetal defects in the 
United States and thousands more abroad.5 Following a rubella epidemic in the 
early 1960s, women infected in the first trimester also confronted dramatically 
higher odds of birth defects.6 
When more women worried about disability in pregnancy, amniocentesis and 
other technologies designed to identify chromosomal abnormalities also became 
more effective and widespread.7 As it seemed increasingly possible to identify 
disabilities before birth, pro-choice physicians, lawyers, and activists made 
disability-based justifications a centerpiece of the demand for the reform of 
abortion laws.8 Even after the movement demanded the complete repeal of all 
abortion restrictions, arguments based on fetal disability or defect continued to 
figure centrally in the pre-1973 argumentative agenda of organizations like the 
National Abortion Rights Action League (then the National Association for the 
Repeal of Abortion Laws, NARAL).9 
																																								 																				
4 Alan F. Guttmacher & Harriet F. Pilpel, Abortion and the Unwanted Child, 2 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 16, 16 (1970). 
5 See, e.g., SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION 
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 14 (1991) (explaining that thalidomide causes 
fetal deformity); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 83 (Brian 
Berry & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 1984) (stating that “[t]he thalidomide cases were very 
much in the mind” of the California Junior Chamber of Commerce when considering 
whether or not to continue pregnancy to term in difficult situations). 
6 See, e.g., LESLIE J. REAGAN, DANGEROUS PREGNANCIES: MOTHERS, DISABILITIES, 
AND ABORTION IN MODERN AMERICA 60–63 (2010) (explaining that thalidomide had 
severely harmed ten thousand or more children). 
7 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Powell, The Current State of Prenatal Genetic Testing in the 
United States, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 44, 45–46 (Erik Parens & 
Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (explaining that these technologies were capable of detecting 
many disabilities, and by the 1980s, most women were being offered the screenings during 
pregnancies); RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF 
AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 29–30 (1999) (explaining how the technology of prenatal 
diagnosis continues to evolve at a rapid pace). 
8 For examples of these arguments, see Society for Science & the Public, Need New 
Abortion Laws, 86 SCIENCE NEWS LETTER 397, 397 (1964); Society for Science & the 
Public, Abortion Laws Condemned, 90 SCIENCE NEWS, 320, 320 (1966). Part I discusses 
these claims at greater length.  
9 For examples of these arguments, see NARAL SPEAKER AND DEBATER’S 
NOTEBOOK (1972), in NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, RECORDS OF THE 
NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, 1968–1976: A FINDING AID, Carton 7; 
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After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,10 pro-choice groups mostly 
moved away from the disability-based arguments used in the campaign for 
legalization.11 By contrast, through the later 1970s and early 1980s, pro-lifers 
stepped up arguments that disability discrimination represented an important 
reason to reverse Roe.12 In this analysis, “eugenic” abortion laws had exposed the 
larger damage legalization would do to the society—the denigration of all 
vulnerable and disabled persons before and after birth. This argument played an 
important role in pro-life efforts to discredit the opposition and win allies not 
invested in banning abortion. While organizations like NARAL downplayed the 
potential of fetal defects, related arguments remained a part of activists’ defense of 
both prenatal genetic testing and late-term abortion. 
Starting in the mid-1990s, when Congress dealt with the effort to ban dilation 
and extraction (D&X),13 or “partial-birth abortion,” both social movements 
returned to familiar arguments about disability and abortion. In arguing against the 
ban, pro-choice groups insisted that providers used D&X primarily in cases of 
severe disability.14 While implicitly suggesting that such abortions might be more 
justifiable, abortion opponents replied that physicians performed D&X for reasons 
of convenience.15  
Until the recent introduction of “prenatal discrimination laws,”16 disability-
based justifications remained a strong argument for access to abortion. However, 
																																								 																				
LARRY LADER TO NARAL BOARD MEMBERS RE: THE DAMAGE TO THE ABORTION 
MOVEMENT FROM THE SECOND HOUR OF THE TV REPORT ON THE AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON POPULATION CONTROL (1972), in THE NARAL PAPERS, CARTON 7, DEBATING THE 
OPPOSITION FOLDER, SCHLESINGER LIBRARY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY [hereinafter LARRY 
LADER TO NARAL BOARD MEMBERS]. 
10 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
11 On arguments stressed by pro-choice leaders in the aftermath of Roe, see MARY 
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 121–26 (2015).  
12 For examples of these arguments, see Marlene Cimons, The Activist Surgeon 
General: It Used to Be a Figurehead Position. Then C. Everett Koop Came Along., L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-09-14/magazine/tm-
12280_1_surgeon-general [https://perma.cc/34FG-9ZUB]; Fred Marc Biddle, Bernardin 
Defends Stance on Infertility, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1987), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-04-30/news/8702020199_1_cardinal-bernardin-
vatican-document-vatican-congregation [https://perma.cc/8NNH-9B4Z]. 
13 On the early debate in Congress, see David Espo, Late Term Abortion Ban Passes 
Congress, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 1996, at A1.  
14 See, e.g., Abortion Foes Rip Clinton for Veto Dole Criticizes ‘Extreme’ Position, 
ATL. J. CONST., Apr. 11, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Abortion Foes Rip Clinton] (explaining 
that severe fetal defects prompted five women to have abortions). 
15 See, e.g., Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at 8 (suggesting 
through a newspaper ad that the reasons people seek-late term abortions include not being 
able to “fit into prom dress”). 
16 For an example of such a model law, see AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, PRENATAL 
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2016 
LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2015), http://www.aul.org/downloads/2016-Legislative-Guides/ 
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after 2000, when pro-life groups began experimenting more with laws banning 
abortion on the basis of sex or gender, disability-based bans gained support.17 
Nonetheless, as the history of disability and abortion suggests, the current 
understanding of the relationship between Down Syndrome, other conditions, and 
abortion is neither inevitable nor unchanging. 
 
A.  Disability Serves as a Justification for Abortion Reform and Repeal 
 
Prior to the 1950s, the controversy centered on abortion in the case of 
hereditary defects. For example, in 1936, a committee chartered by the British 
Medical Association agreed that abortion should be legal when there “is reasonable 
certainty that serious disease will be transmitted to the child,” including in cases of 
hereditary blood disorders and mental illness.18 From roughly 1900 to 1945, in the 
United States and abroad, a powerful eugenic legal reform movement contended 
that a variety of undesirable behaviors, including sexual promiscuity and 
criminality, had genetic origins.19 The eugenic legal reform movement championed 
statutes restricting access to marriage and mandating the sterilization of the unfit.20 
In the early twentieth century, the movement enjoyed widespread influence, 
prompting the introduction of more than 30 sterilization laws and forging an often-
troubled partnership with early proponents of family planning, including Margaret 
Sanger and Planned Parenthood.21 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the earliest eugenic 




17 For examples of the push for these laws, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
18 T.N.A. Jeffcoate, Indications for Therapeutic Abortion, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 582, 585 
(1960). 
19 On the history of the eugenic legal reform movement, see DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN 
THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 92–94 (1985); 
WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM THE 
TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 2–3 (2001); STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI 
CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1994); 
MARK LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1–4 (2008). 
20 On the laws advocated by the eugenic legal reform movement, see KEVLES, supra 
note 19, at 99–100; LARGENT, supra note 19, at 65–66, 127–28. 
21 On the passage of eugenic sterilization laws, see LARGENT, supra note 19, at 65–66, 
127–28. On the relationship between the early family planning movement and eugenic 
legal reformers, see JEAN H. BAKER, MARGARET SANGER: A LIFE OF PASSION 162–63, 
201–22 (2011); NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER SCIENCE, AND THE 
ANATOMY OF NATIONALISM 130–48 (2003); see also Mary Ziegler, Eugenic Feminism: 
Mental Hygiene, The Women’s Movement, and the Campaign for Eugenic Legal Reform, 
31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 211, 211–31 (2008) (discussing early feminism’s role in 
eugenics policy formation during the early twentieth century).  
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fueled the movement for compulsory sterilization.22 At a time when eugenic 
concerns seemed applicable to a small group with known hereditary disorders, the 
kind of justification invoked by the British Medical Association did little to 
influence abortion laws. Since relatively few Americans had a known hereditary 
disorder, eugenic justifications seemed likely to authorize only a small number of 
abortions. 
After World War II, the eugenic legal reform movement found itself in 
retreat.23 Scientists discredited many of the core arguments of the eugenic legal 
reform movement, and legislators shied away from enforcing laws that closely 
resembled those applied in Nazi Germany.24 While the idea of eugenics lost 
influence, however, disability-based justifications for abortion gained support. 
Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, as researchers learned that environment 
contributed significantly to the existence of fetal defects, a lack of abortion access 
in cases of fetal abnormality seemed likely to affect more Americans.25 As early as 
1941, physicians found evidence that rubella, a contagious viral disease, 
significantly increased the risk of fetal defects.26 The 1950s witnessed the 
publication of a wide variety of studies suggesting that fetal defects resulted not 
only from genetics but also from the environment and a complex interaction 
between the two.27  
In the 1950s and 1960s, news broke that thalidomide, a drug produced in 
Germany, had resulted in over 10,000 cases of severe birth defects.28 Although the 
drug was never licensed in the United States, the thalidomide controversy drove 
home that non-genetic factors could produce fetal abnormalities, and several 
children in the United States suffered from severe birth defects traceable to the 
drug.29  
																																								 																				
22 See, e.g., Jeffcoate, supra note 18, at 585 (listing potential fetal abnormalities such 
as serious disease or hereditary blood disorders that will be transmitted to the child). 
23 On the movement’s loss of influence, see ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF 
SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1–2 (1992); NATHANIEL DEUTSCH, INVENTING 
AMERICA’S WORST FAMILY, EUGENICS, ISLAM, AND THE FALL AND RISE OF THE TRIBE OF 
ISHMAEL 16 (2009); LARGENT, supra note 19, at 116–17.  
24 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra Part I. 
26 Herbert Packer & Ralph Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and 
Politics, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 434 (1959). 
27 JOHN E. MORISON, FOETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY 15 (1952); F. Clarke 
Fraser & T.D. Fainstat, Causes of Congenital Defects, 82 AM J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 
593, 593–96 (1951); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to 
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 555 (1962). 
28 SCOTT AINSWORTH & THAD HALL, ABORTION POLITICS IN CONGRESS: STRATEGIC 
INCREMENTALISM AND POLICY CHANGE 4–5 (2011); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION 
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 12 (1987); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 60–63 (2010). 
29 STAGGENBORG, supra note 5, at 14; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 266 n.13. 
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The 1962 case of Sherri Finkbine, a middle-class, white television presenter, 
made disability-based abortion more compelling.30 Finkbine had taken thalidomide 
during her pregnancy and became deeply concerned about fetal defects.31 After a 
hospital refused Finkbine’s request for an abortion, she filed a lawsuit, using the 
testimony of psychiatrists to establish that it would harm her to “have a deformed 
baby.”32 After the birth of several disabled children whose mothers had taken 
thalidomide, a court dismissed Finkbine’s suit, concluding that if physicians and 
prosecutors agreed that her life would be threatened by continuing her pregnancy, 
there was no case or controversy to resolve.33 Fearing prosecution, Finkbine and 
her husband traveled to Sweden, a country that authorized abortions in cases of 
fetal defect.34  
Finkbine’s struggles helped bolster demand for legalizing abortion, at least 
when a child might be born with severe abnormalities.35 In 1962, Rabbi Israel 
Margolies, later a prominent pro-choice figure, explained: 
 
The truly civilized mind would be hard put to devise a greater sin than to 
condemn an innocent infant to the twilight world of living death, or to 
sentence two innocent parents to a life term of caring for . . . a creature 
who is a grotesque mockery of God’s image.36 
 
While thalidomide use in the United States was never widespread, a 1963–
1964 rubella epidemic reshaped public attitudes.37 Estimates of the odds of fetal 
defects for a woman exposed to rubella in the first trimester of pregnancy ran from 
10% to 90%.38 While abortion laws at the time did not authorize abortions in cases 
of fetal defect, some hospitals agreed to perform the procedure for rubella 
victims.39 However, in the winter of 1963, when a rubella epidemic hit the East 
Coast, the disability politics of abortion took on new urgency.40 That year, 
Massachusetts recorded five times the number of cases treated in the previous year, 
																																								 																				
30 On the influence of Finkbine’s case, see SARA DUBOW, OURSELVES UNBORN: A 
HISTORY OF THE FETUS IN MODERN AMERICA 64–66 (2011); RICKIE SOLINGER, 
PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA 
179–81 (2005); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 58–59. 
31 REAGAN, supra note 6, at 58–59.  
32 Abortion Suit Is Filed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1962, at 25. 
33 Mother Loses Round in Legal Battle for Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1962, at 9; 
Mother, Rebuffed in Arizona, May Seek Abortion Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1962, at 
19. 
34 U.S. Mother Seeks Aid from Sweden, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1962, at 64. 
35 See sources cited supra note 30. 
36 Rabbi Attacks Abortion Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1962, at 76.  
37 REAGAN, supra note 6, at 1–25.  
38 Packer & Gampell, supra note 26, at 434. 
39 Edwin M. Schur, Abortion and the Social System, 3 SOC. PROBS. 94, 99 (1955). 
40 On the rubella epidemic in 1963, see FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960 163–64 (1999); DUBOW, supra note 30, at 
65. 
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while New York City battled a sixteen fold increase.41 By 1964, New York City 
reported more than 10,000 new cases.42 At a time when any pregnant woman faced 
the possibility of a rubella infection and all that it entailed, the need for new 
abortion laws seemed evident to a larger group of people.  
In the aftermath of the thalidomide and rubella controversies, family-planning 
organizations and physicians more often used disability as a justification for 
legalizing abortion. As early as 1959, the American Law Institute (ALI) had set out 
a proposed reform law that would authorize abortion under certain circumstances, 
including cases in which a child would be born with a “grave physical or mental 
defect.”43 Supporters of abortion used fears of fetal disability and defect as a key 
reason to reform abortion laws. In 1964, speakers at the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America convention argued that abortion should be legal, at least in 
cases of fetal defect.44 Dr. Robert E. Hall presented related justifications as the 
most obvious reason for abortion reform.45 In cases of defect or disability, he 
argued that abortion would be “condoned by [physicians’] consciences, accepted 
by their peers and demanded by their patients.”46 
Other supporters of abortion reform used similar reasoning. “Our present law 
prohibits termination of pregnancy with the result that many infants are forced to 
suffer through their blighted lives, a burden to themselves, their families, and to 
society,” argued Robert Force, the author of a proposed abortion reform bill in 
Indiana.47 “For society to compel this result borders on the grotesque.”48 Ruth 
Lidz, another supporter of abortion reform, put the point bluntly: “As a physician, I 
believe that in a proven abnormality of a fetus it could be immoral and inhumane 
to subject the mother, her family and, perhaps, society to the burdens of bearing, 
nuturing [sic] and rearing an abnormal child.”49 
Given the physical suffering and societal discrimination some believed 
“abnormal” children faced, reformers used bans on abortion in cases of fetal defect 
to showcase the irrationality and cruelty of broad abortion bans. At a time when 
few agreed on when, if at all, abortion should be legal, reformers framed disability-
based abortions as obviously moral and medically necessary. These arguments 
helped to explain the progress of ALI-style bills in a handful of states over the 
course of the 1960s. Twelve states introduced such laws in less than a decade.50 
																																								 																				
41 REAGAN, supra note 6, at 57. 
42 Id. 
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 22, 1959). 
44 Need New Abortion Laws, supra note 8, at 397. 
45 Abortion Laws Condemned, supra note 8, at 320. 
46 Id. 
47 Robert Force, Legal Problems of Abortion Reform, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 364, 371–72 
(1967).  
48 Id. at 372.  
49 Ruth W. Lidz, Review: More Light on Abortion, FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63, 63 (1971). 
50 See, e.g., GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, 
AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (2005) (listing some of the states 
that enacted ALI-type laws by 1970); LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE 
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The fetal-defect exception written into the ALI model appeared to be a part of the 
blueprint for future abortion laws. 
Moreover, arguments about defects and disabilities fit well alongside an 
existing reform message about the benefits of allowing women to have only 
wanted children. Throughout the 1960s, Planned Parenthood had painted a dire 
picture of the consequences of compulsory pregnancy, including a perceived spike 
in juvenile delinquency.51 Planned Parenthood leader William Vogt similarly tied 
juvenile delinquency to uncurbed population growth and unwanted children. In 
criticizing the delinquency reforms recently championed by then New York State 
Attorney General Jacob Javits,52 Vogt wrote: “It is well known that unloved and 
‘rejected’ children are prone to become neurotics. Much juvenile misbehavior 
shows a marked neurotic pattern.”53 Vogt further contended that some working 
mothers, many of them likely poor, were guilty of “maternal neglect.”54 In either 
case, Vogt insisted, “Perhaps these poor youngsters should never have been born at 
all to parents, who, because of their own deficiencies, are unable to provide their 
children the emotional and spiritual environment indispensable to their health.”55 
Because Planned Parenthood already used arguments about the harm done to the 
larger society by unwanted children, claims about fetal defects fit well in the 
organization’s argumentative agenda.  
While the ALI proposal was in ascendancy, technological advances made it 
possible for parents to identify a broader array of defects in utero. By the late 
1960s, amniocentesis—a procedure used to detect chromosomal abnormalities—
had become a common obstetric procedure.56 In 1968, the New York Times 
reported that many area hospitals performed abortions if physicians detected a 
chromosomal abnormality, especially in cases of Down Syndrome.57 Indeed, the 
Times suggested that physicians were the most willing to perform therapeutic 
abortions in cases of fetal defect.58  
Notwithstanding the growing support for abortion in cases of disability, 
abortion reformers moved away from the disability-based arguments of the early 
1960s. Frustrated by the results observed in states with the ALI proposal in place, 
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56 See sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
57 Robert Reinhold, Abortions Linked to Genetic Defect: Fetal Tests Said to Be Used 
as Basis for Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1968, at 19. 
58 Id. 
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the leaders of pro-choice groups concluded that nothing less than complete repeal 
of abortion restrictions would ensure meaningful access to abortion.59 Because 
some of the statutory grounds for abortion could be interpreted narrowly, some 
physicians in ALI states like California refused to perform the procedure.60 
Convinced that the ALI bill had not worked, abortion reformers downplayed the 
fetal-defect arguments sometimes used to support it. In 1966, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern California explained the reasoning of many 
repeal groups:  
 
There appears to be extensive public acceptance of [repeal when there 
is] . . . a substantial risk that the offspring would be born with grave 
mental or physical defects. . . . However, the ACLU of Southern 
California believes that . . . the true issue is the individual’s fundamental, 
personal right to determine when and whether to produce offspring 
without interference by the state.61 
 
In 1967, the national ACLU also began experimenting with constitutional 
arguments, and leaders of the organization framed abortion as a constitutional 
right—not a subject for legislative discretion.62 The following year, Planned 
Parenthood (then known as Planned Parenthood-World Population) voted in favor 
of a resolution demanding the repeal of all abortion bans.63 Like the ACLU 
statement, the Planned Parenthood resolution framed legal abortion as a matter of 
constitutional law involving the rights of patients to receive medical treatment and 
																																								 																				
59 See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, 
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60 See, e.g., Keith Monroe, How California’s Abortion Law Isn’t Working, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1968, at 29.  
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Committee (Dec. 7, 1966), 1–4, (on file with the Schlesinger Library at Harvard 
University).  
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Parenthood: Proper Medical Procedures, Agency Says —Asks End of Laws Forbidding 
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the rights of physicians to provide it.64 In 1969, when NARAL organized, the 
group also used constitutional rhetoric to describe its goal.65  
The reasons for the spread of constitutional justifications were evident in a 
meeting held the same year for all reformers by the Abortion Reform Association 
(ARA), a group that funded state level repeal efforts. In 1969, the ARA hosted a 
strategy workshop for different groups supporting legal abortion.66 Attendees 
agreed to demand nothing less than complete repeal and to describe abortion 
primarily as “a woman’s civil right.”67 While frustrated with the functioning of 
ALI-style statutes, attendees also argued that a rights-based formulation would 
appeal to more women and “allay concerns about genocide.”68 In their own 
organizations and groups dedicated to abortion reform, feminists embraced rights 
arguments, seeing women’s interests as the central issue in the abortion debate. 
Because fetal-defect justifications remained tied to an ALI proposal that many 
found inadequate, the disability-based justifications fell somewhat out of favor. 
As soon as the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, disability-based 
justifications reemerged, this time as part of the response to the rise of an 
increasingly sophisticated pro-life movement. In the late 1960s, reformers 
continued relying on disability-based justifications for abortion under certain 
circumstances, particularly when explaining the inadequacy of ALI-style bills.69 
Garret Hardin, an ecologist and supporter of population control policies, published 
an article arguing that the ALI would not allow abortions in many cases of fetal 
defect.70 As Hardin explained, women whose children had severe fetal 
abnormalities might still have been denied an abortion under the ALI statute 
because the probability of defect in a particular case was too low or because they 
did not have access to prenatal testing that would reveal the existence of an 
abnormality.71 Roy Lucas, one of the attorneys who would help engineer the 
challenge in Roe v. Wade, echoed Hardin’s argument.72 While reminding the 
American public of the value of abortion in cases of disability or defect, Hardin 
and Lucas argued that only the complete repeal of abortion restrictions would 
guarantee women the power to terminate pregnancies in cases of fetal defect.73  
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246, 246–51 (1968). 
70 See id. 
71 See, e.g., id. (explaining that the probability of defective embryos is generally low 
and women often did not have access to abnormality-revealing prenatal testing). 
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When the pro-life movement began making progress, groups like NARAL 
also turned to disability-based justifications to explain the need for repeal. Starting 
in the mid-1960s, as states began considering the reform or repeal of existing laws, 
an opposition mobilized to defend existing bans.74 Often supported by local 
Catholic dioceses, early pro-life groups began experimenting with images of late 
term abortions as a tool to defeat referenda and persuade legislators.75 Dr. John 
Willke of Ohio perfected a slide show later used in many states to heighten public 
discomfort with abortion.76 At times, pro-lifers using these images had great 
success. Before Roe, New York, one of the few states to repeal all abortion 
restrictions, passed a law reinstituting old restrictions before Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller vetoed the measure.77 In 1972, pro-lifers in Michigan defeated a 
proposed referendum legalizing abortion.78 The images circulated by the pro-life 
movement clearly resonated with an ambivalent public. 
The leaders of the pro-choice movement recognized the need to develop an 
effective reply to the images deployed by the opposition. NARAL leaders used 
disability-based arguments to help counter the fetal-rights strategy that pro-lifers 
had used so effectively. The organization’s pre-1973 debate manual included a 
claim that “[l]egal abortion could decrease the tragedy of the birth of deformed 
children.”79  
In 1972, disability-based arguments again attracted attention after NARAL 
members participated in a major television debate.80 During the event, pro-lifer 
Marjory Mecklenburg stunned the audience by displaying an aborted fetus.81 
Frustrated by the outcome, NARAL leader Larry Lader urged his colleagues to 
avoid a similar debacle by drawing on the shock value of fetal defects.82 “When 
they bring up innocent fetal life,” Lader advised, “keep hammering on . . . the 
deformed and unwanted infant, . . . the horror of bringing a deformed child into the 
world with half a head, no arms, etc.”83 The group later developed visual materials 
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that similarly spotlighted fetal defects.84 As one prominent pamphlet explained: 
“Legal abortion means . . . women can’t be forced to bear a deformed child. Which 
do you prefer . . . legal abortion? Or an anencephalous ‘baby’?”85  
Before Roe, disability-based arguments helped activists explain why nothing 
less than complete repeal would serve the needs of the American public. Instead of 
merely arguing for abortion in cases of fetal defect, pro-choice advocates insisted 
that nothing short of repeal would ensure that women could terminate pregnancies 
when providers detected a fetal abnormality. At the same time, as pro-lifers 
perfected visual images of abortion, supporters of legalization used images of 
disability and defect to invoke the fear, disgust, and anxiety often elicited by the 
opposition. 
After the Roe Court struck down most of the nation’s remaining abortion 
laws,86 the politics of disability and abortion shifted. Seeking to make the most of 
their victory in the Supreme Court, pro-choice activists downplayed concerns 
about fetal defects in favor of arguments about a woman’s right to choose. As 
feminists took the helm of organizations like NARAL and Planned Parenthood,87 
movement leaders directed more attention to arguments about the liberty and 
equality of women. As the decade progressed, however, pro-lifers took up the issue 
of disability, using it to argue for the reversal of Roe and the importance of the 
right to life. While abortion opponents had argued against abortion in cases of fetal 
defect since the mid-1960s, the new disability arguments were more ambitious. 
Pro-lifers argued that as long as abortion remained legal, the nation was on its way 
down a slippery slope that threatened all disabled and vulnerable persons.88 This 
slippery-slope argument helped pro-lifers appeal to those ambivalent about 
abortion and reinforced their claim that abortion opponents, not those on the other 
side, stood up for civil rights. 
 
B.  Pro-Lifers Use Disability to Describe a Slippery Slope 
 
After Roe, the pro-life movement committed to passing a constitutional 
amendment that would outlaw abortion from coast to coast.89 Starting in 1973, 
Congress considered a variety of proposals that would amend the Constitution, all 
of them designed to change the Fourteenth Amendment.90 Well before the 
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2017] DISABILITY POLITICS OF ABORTION 601 
 
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision, pro-life activists had argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment recognized the personhood of the unborn child and protected the fetus 
under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.91 As part of this 
argument, the leaders of groups like the National Right to Life Committee 
(NRLC), the largest national antiabortion organization, sought to position their 
cause as an extension of the social-justice movements of the 1960s, particularly the 
civil rights movement.92 Far from presenting themselves as another conservative 
group, pro-life organizations identified with social movements championing the 
rights of the helpless and defenseless.93  
After Roe, in developing an ideal constitutional proposal, pro-lifers reinforced 
this argument by guaranteeing a right to life not only for the fetus but also for the 
disabled and the elderly. Americans United for Life (AUL), the group that would 
become the nation’s leading pro-life public interest law firm, argued that the 
group’s purpose was: “To impress upon all the dignity and worth of each 
individual life, whatever the state or circumstance, especially mindful of the 
innocent, the incompetent, the impaired, the impoverished, the aged, and all those 
otherwise weak and disadvantaged.”94 Struggling with financial difficulties and 
political isolation, NRLC leaders seeking to broaden their base argued that legal 
abortion was just the beginning of a dangerous trend that would threaten other 
Americans.95 In a 1975 pamphlet, the NRLC described this risk as follows: “The 
questions we must ask ourselves are these: if we allow the killing of the unborn 
now, where does it end?”96 The same year, the organization circulated materials 
arguing that the noble dedication to human life is compromised in the increasing 
attack on individual human life evidenced in abortion, the increasing advocacy of 
infanticide of the defective child, and euthanasia.97 
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Convinced that the pro-life movement could remain unified only if the NRLC 
and sister organizations focused exclusively on abortion, leading groups often 
deemphasized disability issues and pushed the slippery-slope argument only so 
far.98 However, for much of the 1970s, moderate antiabortion groups, including 
American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL), made concern about disability 
discrimination more central to their argumentative agenda.99 In the mid-1970s, 
when neither major political party took a clear stand on abortion, influential 
abortion opponents in Congress, the academy, and leading pro-life groups worked 
with ACCL partly because they worried that a single issue approach would never 
convince politicians to ban abortion.100 ACCL leaders emphasized the importance 
of “present[ing] the pro-life cause and its responsibility in terms of broadly based 
concern for human life rather than narrowly focusing on the fetus only” and 
“establish[ing] the pro-life cause as a legitimate bi-partisan concern.”101 
To achieve this goal, ACCL tried to define a pro-life agenda that would 
protect the handicapped as well as fetal life. “American Citizens Concerned for 
Life is committed to working toward a [world] in which all lives are respected,” 
the organization explained in promotional materials.102 “This protective and 
enabling philosophy of action is not limited to abortion alone but applies to other 
vulnerable classes and individuals, such as the mentally retarded, the aged, and the 
handicapped.”103 In concrete terms, the organization advocated for additional 
funding for research on the prevention of birth defects and developed model 
legislation on end-of-life issues for the disabled.104 
Throughout the 1970s, pro-life groups used the idea of disability 
discrimination to attack legal abortion. In the early 1980s, when the nation dealt 
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with a new controversy surrounding the treatment of severely disabled newborns, 
pro-life groups made disability arguments a more central part of their message and 
strategy.105 Abortion opponents channeled more resources into battling laws 
involving the withdrawal of treatment and aid-in-dying.106 At the same time, 
groups like the NRLC emphasized disability-based concerns even in the battle 
about reproductive rights.107 Activists presented pro-choice organizations as 
heartless and indifferent to the struggles of weak, vulnerable, and handicapped 
persons. Moreover, by pointing to the early relationship between family planners 
and eugenic legal reformers, antiabortion leaders emphasized that genetic 
engineering, not women’s rights, explained their opponents’ commitment to legal 
abortion. While Planned Parenthood and early family planning organizations 
sometimes clashed with the eugenic legal reform movement and pursued a 
different agenda, pro-lifers could score political points by highlighting the prior 
partnership between the two factions and downplaying the differences between 
eugenic supporters, family planners, and the modern pro-choice movement. 
 
C.  The Baby Doe Controversy Makes Disability Arguments a Core Weapon 
 
Notwithstanding pro-life arguments about a slippery slope, in the early 1980s, 
abortion in cases of fetal defect seemed more popular than ever. As early as 1976, 
Congress had allocated over $90 million for research, prevention, and 
identification of fetal defects, and access to prenatal genetic counseling slowly 
increased.108 By 1981, access to counseling had become so widespread that the 
Food and Drug Administration considered bringing to market a consumer product 
that could detect common genetic abnormalities.109 As Jane Brody of the New York 
Times explained: “[I]t might soon become culturally ‘acceptable and even expected 
to avoid the birth of a defective child.’”110 
By 1982, however, the so-called Baby Doe controversy made the rights of 
disabled newborns more hotly debated than ever. In 1982, in Bloomington, 
Indiana, a child born with Down Syndrome suffered from esophageal atresia, a 
defect that physicians could often correct with surgery.111 The child’s parents 
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declined surgery, and the infant died.112 President Ronald Reagan responded by 
ordering the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to withhold federal 
funding from any public health care facility that refused to provide lifesaving care 
to severely handicapped newborns, citing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a 
forerunner of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that outlawed disability 
discrimination in federal programs.113  
In March 1983, HHS issued regulations based on the Rehabilitation Act, 
prompting a coalition of health care providers to file suit.114 In American Academy 
of Pediatrics v. Heckler, the district court struck down the rules on procedural 
grounds.115 The same year, Baby Jane Doe was born in Long Island, New York.116 
Jane Doe also suffered from a defect correctable with surgery, but because of 
several handicaps, physicians informed her parents that she would be severely 
physically and mentally handicapped even if she survived.117 When Jane Doe’s 
parents initially refused surgery, a pro-life attorney, Larry Washburn, sought 
appointment as guardian ad litem in state court, and the Reagan Justice Department 
asked the federal courts to intervene, invoking the Baby Doe Rules to force the 
hospital to release medical records.118  
In the meantime, in January 1984, the Reagan Administration issued final 
Baby Doe Rules, and Congress amended the federal Child Abuse Prevention and 
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Treatment Act to cover disabled newborns.119 After the American Medical 
Association and the American Hospital Association again attacked the Baby Doe 
Rules, the case eventually reached the Supreme Court.120 In Bowen v. American 
Hospital Association, the Court struck down the regulations, holding that 
mandatory requirements outlined in the rules found no justification in the 
Rehabilitation Act.121 
The Baby Doe wars transformed the priorities and message of antiabortion 
groups. Calling the Baby Doe conflict “a landmark in the rights of infants,” 
Washburn and his allies developed a network of nurses who would report on the 
perceived mistreatment of handicapped newborns.122 AUL held its first major 
conference about Baby Doe litigation and legislation, and by 1984, the 
organization committed half of its budget to fighting what members saw as 
euthanasia.123 Other pro-life groups stepped up their involvement in end-of-life 
debates. In 1984, James Bopp, Jr., the general counsel for the NRLC, founded the 
National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled, a public-interest 
litigation group designed to focus “primarily on the medical and legal issues in the 
treatment of the critically or terminally ill handicapped and medically dependent 
persons.”124 Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, an NRLC affiliate, argued that 
the right to die, including the withdrawal of treatment, threatened “a wide range of 
people,” including the “aged, the mentally ill, the retarded, etc.”125 
In the mid-1980s, pro-life activists and political figures soon took up 
arguments against amniocentesis and genetic screening as well as abortion. In the 
first part of the decade, Surgeon General Edward Koop, a vocal critic of abortion, 
condemned amniocentesis as a “search and destroy mission” that would encourage 
more women to terminate their pregnancies.126 In 1987, the Vatican issued a 
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statement condemning any use of prenatal screening that would lead to abortion as 
“gravely illicit.”127 Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the chairman of the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Pro-Life Committee, backed the Pope’s position: 
“If we are not comfortable with turning the creation of human life into an 
impersonal or ‘pick and choose’ process, what principles exist to restrain such 
activity?”128 
Concerned that pro-lifers would use arguments against amniocentesis to limit 
abortion access, some pro-choice politicians and activists began defending 
women’s right to terminate pregnancies in cases of fetal defect or disability. In 
Illinois, state pro-life groups lobbied for a bill that would allow physicians to 
refuse to perform amniocentesis for reasons of conscience.129 While Illinois pro-
lifers reiterated arguments about the “eugenic” motives of many women seeking 
abortion, the leader of a state affiliate of the ACLU labeled the law “immoral,” 
insisting that under such a statute, “pregnant women would be denied vital medical 
information to make informed decisions.”130 
As the Illinois controversy suggested, pro-choice groups soon leveraged 
anxiety about fetal abnormality to counter a new pro-life attack on late-term 
abortion. That campaign gained momentum in 1987, when the NRLC began 
screening the Silent Scream, a short film that supposedly showed the abortion of a 
19.5 week-old fetus.131 Hoping to benefit from longstanding public discomfort 
with late term abortions, groups like the NRLC emphasized the film’s claim that 
“[l]ate abortion was especially odious.”132 In trying to render the Silent Scream less 
effective, pro-choice leaders fell back on popular support for access to abortion in 
cases of disability. Citing the fact that most women did not have amniocentesis 
until late in pregnancy, Douglas Gould of Planned Parenthood insisted that women 
had late-term abortions “for some of the most compelling reasons imaginable,” 
including those based on disability.133  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, NARAL’s debating guidebook, Choice, 
also foregrounded arguments about fetal defects. In responding to arguments about 
amniocentesis, NARAL included the following arguments: 
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Less than 3% of such tests result in abortion. The tests permit parents 
who know they are at risk of giving birth to a child with birth defects to 
conceive. . . . It is heartless to deny parents access to medical technology 
that would permit them to avoid giving birth to an incurably ill or 
severely retarded infant.134  
 
In part, NARAL argued that genetic counseling and amniocentesis did not 
necessarily lead to abortion and might actually convince some parents to carry a 
pregnancy to term. Nevertheless, as Gould did in response to the Silent Scream, 
NARAL framed permitting abortion for reasons of disability and defect as 
legitimate and compassionate. NARAL suggested that any compassionate 
lawmaker would understand the reasons that parents wished to avoid “giving birth 
to an incurably ill or severely retarded infant.”135 
In the debate manual, the threat of fetal defects also represented a primary 
rationale for keeping late-term abortions legal.136 The manual included a common 
pro-life argument that women waited too long for abortions and too often sought 
out the procedure after the first trimester.137 In the proposed response, the manual 
highlighted that most fetal defects, including those detected by amniocentesis, 
could not be discovered until later in pregnancy.138 
Later in the 1990s, the pro-life movement focused on banning a particular late 
term abortion procedure, D&X, that activists labeled partial birth abortion.139 For 
pro-choice leaders, the risk of fetal defects helped to counter the quest to ban a 
procedure that many in the public opposed.140 Pro-lifers framed D&X as a 
procedure providers performed for reasons of convenience.141 Those leading 
organizations like NARAL replied that providers used D&X only in rare and 
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morally compelling cases, including instances of fetal defects.142 The logic of the 
partial-birth abortion debate assumed that fetal disabilities counted among the most 
reasonable grounds for choosing abortion. 
 
D.  The Partial-Birth Abortion Battle Revives Disability-Based Justifications 
 
In the mid-1990s, when pro-lifers led a battle against D&X, pro-choice groups 
put new emphasis on disability-based justifications for abortion. The pro-life 
movement zeroed in on D&X because of public discomfort with late-term 
abortions.143 Describing D&X in great detail, abortion opponents inside and 
outside of Congress asserted that women having abortions late in pregnancy had no 
legitimate reason to do so.144 In arguing against the so-called “partial-birth” 
abortion ban, pro-choice groups emphasized that providers used D&X as a 
measure of last resort—in cases in which a woman’s health could be compromised 
or a child would be born with grave abnormalities.145 For leading pro-choice 
groups, fetal disability remained one of the unquestionable arguments for choosing 
abortion.  
However, the partial-birth abortion debate forced some in the pro-choice 
movement to reconsider how to handle justifications for abortion that made many 
uncomfortable. Because the struggle focused on the issue of fetal abnormalities, 
disability-rights activists questioned the ease with which many turned to abortion 
in fetal-defect cases.146  
Although the disability-rights movement had mobilized earlier and scored 
important victories in Congress and the courts, by the late 1990s, concern about 
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disability discrimination became mainstream.147 Worried about alienating 
handicapped individuals and their families, some in the pro-choice movement 
questioned the value of disability-based arguments for abortion.148 Recognizing 
that disability-based justifications could be a strategic handicap for those on the 
other side, the pro-life movement also experimented with abortion bans explicitly 
based on disability discrimination, including those prohibiting the abortion of 
children with Down Syndrome.149  
In 1995, Ohio became the first state to ban elective use of D&X.150 By 
September 1996, Congress had passed a federal ban.151 With late abortions center 
stage, the pro-choice movement found itself in a politically difficult position. A 
July 1996 Gallup Poll found that more than 70% of respondents favored a 
prohibition on D&X.152  
President Bill Clinton sparked considerable controversy when he vetoed the 
ban.153 Republican leaders used the partial-birth abortion ban to present pro-choice 
activists as dangerous extremists. Senator Bob Dole, a leading Republican in 
Congress, argued that the pro-choice movement’s rejection of a partial-birth 
abortion ban reflected “the extreme position of those who support abortion at any 
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time, at any place and for any reason.”154 Some claimed that physicians performed 
partial-birth abortions for trivial reasons, including instances in which parents did 
not want a child born with a cleft palate.155  
The pro-choice movement responded by treating D&X as a measure of last 
resort, available only in the most readily justifiable abortions.156 When Clinton 
vetoed the bill, several women who had terminated pregnancies because their 
children would have suffered from devastating fetal disorders joined him.157 A 
strategy centered around disabilities, defects, and disorders would shape much of 
the rest of pro-choice strategy in the partial-birth abortion wars, especially outside 
of court. Whereas pro-life activists presented the ban as a modest effort to 
recognize the value of fetal life ignored by women who waited too long to 
terminate a pregnancy,158 Kate Michelman, the leader of NARAL, maintained that 
Clinton had “chosen compassion and concern for families facing medical 
tragedies. . .”159  
The partial-birth abortion struggle soon revolved around the legitimacy of all 
late-term abortions. Michelman defended abortions late in pregnancy by arguing 
that “late-term abortions are used to protect a woman’s health or life or because of 
grave fetal abnormality.”160 Pro-lifers responded that all abortion decisions—
including those late in pregnancy—came for frivolous reasons.161 The National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops ran an ad campaign arguing that women had 
partial birth abortions because they “w[ouldn]’t fit into [their] prom dress.”162 
Although Clinton promised to sign a version of the bill with a health exception, 
Congress passed the ban without any such exception, and Clinton vetoed the bill 
again in the fall of 1997.163  
The central role of fetal defects in the partial-birth abortion wars prompted 
pro-choice leaders to take stock of the arguments used to defend abortion rights. In 
1998, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe, NARAL hosted a strategy session about how to develop the 
strongest protections for abortion.164 Participants focused on how the rise of pre-
conception and pre-implantation genetic screening could help or hurt the cause of 
legal abortion. These technological shifts, as one participant put it, had 
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“invigorated the debate around private eugenics as opposed to government 
sponsored public eugenics.”165 Another attendee noted: “Disability-rights people 
raised the question about whether aborting [a pregnancy] . . . demeans what it 
[means] to be a human being with a disability.”166 By treating disability as nothing 
more than a justification for abortion, activists did not leave room for solutions that 
acknowledged the moral ambiguity of disability-based abortion. 
Notwithstanding activists’ qualms about the disability politics of abortion, 
pro-choice groups continued relying on exceptions to partial-birth abortion bans 
involving severe fetal abnormalities.167 After the election of George W. Bush in 
2000, the pro-life movement believed that the passage of a ban on D&X had 
become inevitable.168 In 2003, Congress once again debated the ban.169 By the time 
Congress took up the issue, more than thirty states had banned D&X.170 Opponents 
of the ban continued arguing that the law should, at a minimum, allow for abortion 
in cases of severe fetal abnormalities.171 President Bush signed the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act of 2003 into law,172 but over the course of the following decade, 
abortion opponents would soon use disability-based arguments for their own 
purposes. 
 
E.  Pro-Life Activists Use Disability Politics to Restrict Abortion 
 
Starting in the mid-2000s, abortion opponents began transforming the 
disability-based justifications many had used to defend abortion to demand new 
restrictions on access to the procedure. In 2004, conservative commentator Ramesh 
Ponneru criticized parents and providers for reflexively aborting disabled 
fetuses.173 In 2009, in the Human Life Review, a major pro-life publication, activist 
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and writer Mary Meehan wrote an article describing what she characterized as “the 
deep influence of eugenics . . . in encouraging prenatal testing and eugenic 
abortion.”174 As Ponneru recognized, many Americans continued to favor access to 
abortion in cases of disability or defect.175 If abortion opponents could convince 
Americans to oppose disability-based abortion, pro-lifers could turn a longstanding 
weapon available to pro-choice leaders into a political trap. 
Gradually, abortion opponents began translating arguments against disability-
based abortion into concrete legal prohibitions. In 2013, after Arizona passed a law 
banning abortions after twenty weeks, activists in the state questioned the 
constitutionality of the law.176 In particular, physicians challenging the law argued 
that it would unnecessarily prevent women from pursuing abortions in cases of 
“severe or lethal fetal anomaly.”177 A pro-life group, the Center for Bioethics, 
framed the pursuit of disability-based abortion as a reason to restrict abortion, even 
before the point of fetal viability.178 Noting that most abortions after twenty weeks 
took place after the discovery of a defect or disability, the Center urged the Court 
to disavow disability-based abortions.179 Nikolas Nikas of the Center reasoned: 
“Aborting children with disabilities is a form of discrimination that threatens to 
devalue the lives of people born and living with disabilities.”180 
In recent years, a disability-based strategy has continued to advance in pro-
life circles. In 2013, in North Dakota, activists promoted a law that would outlaw 
abortion when a parent wanted to prevent the birth of a child with Down Syndrome 
or another disability.181 The disability ban passed, alongside more stringent 
restrictions that banned abortion as early as six weeks when a fetal heartbeat could 
be detected.182 Abortion providers in the state argued that the fetal-heartbeat law 
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clearly outlawed a large fraction of pre-viability abortions and therefore constituted 
an undue burden under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.183 
Disability-based bans again took center stage in 2015. In January, Indiana 
state legislators considered a bill that would ban abortions performed because of an 
actual or potential physical or mental disability such as Down Syndrome.184 Soon 
after, Texas legislators proposed an informed consent law designed to discourage 
abortion in cases of Down Syndrome.185 In May, Ohio legislators began hearings 
on a law that would ban abortions pursued only because a fetus was diagnosed 
with Down Syndrome.186 “Choosing to end a person’s life simply because of this 
diagnosis is discrimination, period,” explained Representative Sarah LaTourette, 
one of the chief sponsors of the law.187 Bills in Ohio and Missouri are pending at 
the time of this writing, and the fate of the Indiana statute signed into law remains 
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unclear following a federal court decision enjoining enforcement on constitutional 
grounds.188 The AUL has drafted model legislation available to other states that 
want to follow suit.189 
As Part II shows, the kind of measure proposed in Ohio has both functional 
and constitutional flaws that make it unworkable. However, as the history of 
disability and abortion suggests, motive-based bans will still influence the law and 
politics of abortion even if those statutes are never enforced. 
 
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH DISABILITY-BASED ABORTION BANS 
 
In 2013, North Dakota enacted House Bill 1305, which prohibits any provider 
from performing an abortion when she knows that the procedure is sought solely 
for purposes of sex selection or because the fetus has been diagnosed with a 
“genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”190 At present, the 
Ohio bill would prohibit a provider from performing, inducing, or attempting to 
perform an abortion if a woman “is seeking the abortion solely because of a test 
result . . . or a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome in an unborn child.”191 The 
AUL model legislation differs slightly from either statute. Like the North Dakota 
law, the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act would outlaw sex selection and disability-
based abortions.192 With respect to disability, the proposal would make it illegal for 
any provider to intentionally perform an abortion with the knowledge that a 
pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely because a child has been diagnosed 
either with Down Syndrome, genetic abnormality, or a potential of either.193 
At least under current abortion doctrine, each proposal seems likely to fail the 
undue burden test set out in Casey. Even if the Court modifies the Casey 
framework, the bans currently proposed would do little to accomplish the goals of 
the activists and legislators who proposed such a strategy. This Part takes up each 
of these points in turn. 
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A.  The Constitutional Flaws of Disability-Based Bans 
 
Under Casey, a state abortion regulation may not have the purpose or effect of 
creating a substantial obstacle to a woman’s abortion decision.194 While 
recognizing that the state has an interest in potential fetal life throughout a 
pregnancy, a regulation must be calculated to “inform the woman’s free choice, not 
hinder it.”195 States have the power to create “a structural mechanism by which the 
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the 
life of the unborn” or to introduce laws designed to “persuade [women] to choose 
childbirth over abortion.”196 Casey further upheld “truthful and non-misleading” 
laws involving informed consent, as well as parental involvement restrictions that 
provide a judicial bypass option for mature minors.197  
The first problem with disability-based abortion bans involves the viability 
principle upheld in Casey. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court permitted states to 
advance an interest in protecting fetal life only after viability, the point at which a 
child can survive outside the womb.198 While rejecting Roe’s trimester framework, 
the Casey Court reaffirmed the importance of viability as a dividing line.199 In part, 
Casey relied on the importance of stare decisis in reaching a decision.200 
Nevertheless, the Casey Court found merit in drawing the line at viability.201 The 
majority explained that viability was the most workable boundary for abortion 
rights.202 As importantly, the Casey Court concluded that drawing the line at 
viability was the fairest result.203 “In some broad sense,” the Court explained, “it 
might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the 
State’s intervention on behalf of the developing child.”204 
Disability-bans outlaw all abortions chosen for a particular reason, both pre-
and post-viability. Would this create the kind of burden described in Casey? While 
the Court has decided only a handful of cases on abortion since 1992, the Justices’ 
decision in Gonzales v. Carhart205 offers some guidance. Carhart first offers 
reason for skepticism about a challenge to disability bans under the Casey purpose 
prong. The Court identified three legislative purposes supporting the federal 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act under the Casey framework—the “coarsen[ing] of 
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent 
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human life,” the protection of the medical community and its reputation, and the 
prevention of post-abortion regret.206 
Arguably, several of these purposes might support a disability-based ban. 
Carhart recognized a state interest in protecting all “vulnerable” life, a term that 
could be understood to include the disabled.207 The interest in protecting the 
integrity of the medical profession, as understood in Carhart, also arguably 
supports a disability-based ban. Carhart emphasized the importance of preserving 
the image of a profession tasked with saving life.208 Arguably, disability-based 
abortions would undermine that image. Of course, the Carhart Court put particular 
emphasis on the nature of D&X and its resemblance to infanticide.209 Disability-
based abortions could take place at any point in pregnancy and would not 
necessarily invoke the kind of disgust expressed by the majority in Carhart.210 
Nevertheless, given the relatively generous reading of Casey’s purpose prong so 
far used by a majority, a disability ban may well survive Casey’s purpose analysis. 
Casey’s effect prong may well prove more problematic for disability-based 
bans. Carhart is easily distinguishable from any case involving disability bans. 
The Partial-Birth Abortion Act did not prevent women from having an abortion. At 
most, the law ruled a particular procedure out of bounds. The effect analysis in 
Carhart turned on whether the law should fail because it lacked an explicit 
exception for women’s life or health.211 In the face of what the Court saw as 
scientific uncertainty, the majority held that a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act failed.212 By contrast, for women motivated by a particular diagnosis, 
disability-based bans make abortion of any kind impossible to access. Casey 
explains that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, 
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”213 By outlawing abortion for 
any woman choosing the procedure for one particular reason, disability-based bans 
deprive women of the final say in a way that contravenes the principles set forth in 
Casey. 
The other regulations considered by the Casey Court also differ significantly 
in their effect from a disability-based ban. This distinction becomes clear in 
comparing a disability-based ban to restrictions upheld in Casey and its progeny. 
The Casey Court first upheld an informed consent provision that forced a woman 
to consider certain information about the gestational age of the fetus, the law of 
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child support, and the details of the abortion procedure.214 The Court upheld the 
requirement, explaining: “If the information the State requires to be made available 
to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be 
permissible.”215  
Casey also upheld a 24-hour waiting period provision.216 In analyzing this part 
of the challenged statute, the Court repeated findings made by the district court 
about the obstacles imposed by the waiting period: some women would have to 
make two visits to the doctor and incur additional expenses to do so; women would 
face potential harassment from antiabortion picketers on more than one occasion; 
and some women would have difficulty explaining repeated absences to employers 
or partners.217 While describing some of these findings as “troubling,” the Casey 
Court distinguished the “increased costs and potential delays” created by the 
waiting period from the kind of obstacle that would constitute an undue burden.218 
At least on the record before the Court, Casey did not treat laws that made 
abortions more difficult for some women to obtain as undue burdens.219  
A disability-based ban, by contrast, makes abortion impossible to access at 
any point in pregnancy for women who pursue the procedure for a particular 
reason. Casey emphasizes the importance of allowing women to have the final say 
because of the consequences, both symbolic and concrete, of reproductive 
decisions.220 In practical terms, disability-based bans take these decisions away 
from women entirely. In symbolic terms, such a ban substitutes the state’s 
judgment about the reasons for terminating a pregnancy for a woman’s own. 
Because Casey confirms that a woman must be the final decision maker in any 
reproductive decision, disability-based bans are constitutionally problematic. 
The Casey Court’s analysis of a spousal-notice provision reinforces this 
concern.221 At the time of the litigation, Pennsylvania law prohibited any physician 
from performing an abortion, absent a medical emergency, if a woman did not 
certify in writing that she had informed her husband that she was terminating a 
pregnancy.222 The law also created an exemption for a woman certifying in writing 
that she was pregnant as the result of spousal sexual assault, that her husband did 
not impregnate her, that she could not locate her husband, or that she feared death 
or serious injury if she did notify her husband.223  
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Notwithstanding these exemptions, the Court concluded that the law 
constituted an undue burden.224 Emphasizing the possibility of domestic violence, 
the Court explained: 
 
The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a 
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not 
merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for 
many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind 
ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for 
their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from 
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed 
abortion in all cases.225  
 
In Casey, it was not dispositive that many women did not face the possibility 
of domestic violence.226 For those women who were in abusive relationships, the 
law created an insurmountable obstacle to abortion access. Similarly, in the context 
of disability-based abortion, many women may pursue abortion for other reasons. 
Nevertheless, for those women who do wish to terminate a pregnancy after a test 
for Down Syndrome or some other disability, access to abortion would be just as 
limited as it would if the state had outlawed abortion altogether.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt227 may cast even more doubt on the constitutionality of disability-based 
abortion bans. Whole Woman’s Health involved a challenge to two Texas laws, a 
measure requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a nearby 
hospital and a provision requiring clinics to comply with the regulations governing 
ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs).228 By a vote of 5 to 3, the Court struck down 
both provisions, concluding that Casey required courts to balance the benefits and 
costs of abortion restrictions and reasoning that states could not claim a benefit to 
women without substantial evidence backing their claims.229 Whole Woman’s 
Health made the undue-burden test much more rigorous, making it less likely that 
any abortion regulation will survive in Court.230 Moreover, the decision signaled 
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that the Court was not yet willing to retreat from Casey, suggesting that “nothing 
in Roe, Casey, or any other subsequent Supreme Court decisions suggests that a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to viability can be restricted if exercised 
for a certain reason.”231  
At a minimum, pre-viability, disability-based bans seem constitutionally 
problematic. Pro-lifers in major social-movement organizations and state 
legislatures have introduced a variety of other laws that clearly seem 
unconstitutional under Casey, including the heartbeat law on the books in North 
Dakota. These laws represent an educated guess that the Supreme Court will 
undermine at least some of the protections that Casey creates. Even if this bet pays 
off, however, disability-based bans are unlikely to accomplish their goal. 
 
B.  Disability-Based Bans Are Difficult to Enforce 
 
Even if disability-based bans were constitutional, there are obvious obstacles 
in the way of their enforcement. The North Dakota law and the AUL model law 
prohibit physicians from performing abortions motivated solely by fetal 
abnormality, whereas the Ohio law outlaws abortions performed at least partly 
because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis.232 None of these proposals explain how 
physicians are to determine why a woman is requesting an abortion.233 One 
possibility is that physicians could learn of a test result from reviewing relevant 
medical records and presume that women will choose to abort after a diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome or some other fetal disability. However, this presumption does 
not hold up to close scrutiny. Some parents will (or will not) choose to terminate a 
pregnancy for a variety of reasons, ranging from moral convictions about abortion, 
religious beliefs about human life, and ideological positions on disability 
discrimination. 
As a second possibility, providers could ask women why they pursued an 
abortion and take their patients at their word. Relying on such a strategy seems 
extremely naïve. Abortion providers—many of whom might be expected to 
disagree with the existence of a disability-based ban—might easily frame a 
question in such a way as to put women on notice about which grounds for 
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abortion are permissible or tell a woman that only certain reasons for abortion are 
legally permissible. To be sure, providers have no obvious duty to ask under any of 
the proposals under consideration at the time of this writing. Moreover, women 
seeking an abortion have every reason to stay silent about their reasons for 
choosing to terminate. Women committed to ending a pregnancy will not reliably 
volunteer information that will prevent providers from performing a procedure.  
Intent is notoriously difficult to prove, as the Court’s jurisprudence under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act makes clear.234 Absent an admission of what motivates a decision, 
courts may rely on circumstantial evidence that would discredit a permissible 
explanation of a particular action.235 In the Title VII context, for example, 
statistical evidence about an employer’s failure to hire minorities may show a race-
neutral explanation is pretextual.236 So too might comparator evidence—the 
differing treatment of a person who resembled a claimant in every way excluding 
her membership in a protected class.237 In the context of disability and abortion, it 
is hard to imagine what kind of circumstantial evidence might exist. For the most 
part, women seeking abortions are not repeat players, and physicians may lack the 
context or experience that would allow them to second-guess women’s 
explanations of their own request. 
Worried about the shortcomings of a strategy based on freedom from state 
interference, scholars have argued for reproductive justice, a more robust 
alternative that rejects the individualism in favor of recognition that “the ability of 
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any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny is linked directly to the 
conditions in her community—and these conditions are not just a matter of 
individual choice and access.”238 In the context of disability, however, mainstream 
pro-choice groups have not consistently learned the lesson offered by supporters of 
reproductive justice. Instead of explaining why women may terminate pregnancy 
in cases of disability and addressing the community conditions that make those 
decisions more likely, activists have often framed disabilities as nothing more than 
a logical reason for individual women to seek abortion. 
The disconnect between reproductive justice and the disability politics of 
abortion matters. Abortion opponents leverage concern about disability and 
abortion in seeking a variety of restrictions, some of which may have more staying 
power than the bans now under consideration. In Congress and the states, pro-lifers 
have spotlighted concern about disability discrimination in pushing for bans on 
abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy.239 Logically, abortion opponents 
could use the same reasoning to lobby for laws restricting access to prenatal and 
pre-implantation genetic testing, amniocentesis, and other diagnostic tools.240 With 
the spread of the Zika epidemic, more pregnant women may face the threat of 
severe fetal abnormalities caused by the virus, and abortion opponents may turn to 
strategies developed in the context of disability-based abortion bans.241 In these 
contexts, disability arguments can create a credibility deficit for pro-choice 
activists focused on women’s ability to make every reproductive choice, including 
the decision to raise a child. By appealing to concern about discrimination, 
antiabortion arguments of this kind may win over ambivalent politicians and 
dampen the enthusiasm of those angry about abortion restrictions.  
To address this danger, activists and lawyers should make disability rights a 
central part of pro-choice work. Protecting women’s ability to make reproductive 
decisions requires not only laws ensuring access to contraception, sex education, 
and abortion but also legal reforms that address the conditions encouraging parents 
to terminate pregnancies in cases of disability. 
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III.  REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY 
 
While disability-based bans may not be enforceable, they may well change 
the political conversation in ways that will make new restrictions on abortion more 
likely. This Part begins by exploring potential side effects of the new focus on 
disability and abortion. These side effects are both tangible and intangible. In 
ideological terms, the focus on disability exposes a possible disconnect between 
the treatment of disability by prominent pro-choice groups and a broader 
commitment to reproductive justice. More concretely, a focus on disability creates 
a potential credibility deficit that may smooth the way for new regulations of 
women’s reproductive health. This Part examines possible solutions for the 
problem disability-based bans have created for supporters of legal abortion. 
 
A.  The Side Effects of Disability-Based Bans 
 
Disability-based abortion bans like the one under consideration in Ohio likely 
will not prevent many disability-based abortions. That is not to say that these 
regulations will leave the abortion debate unchanged. The first issue involves the 
identity and message of those advocating for legal abortion. As this section shows, 
starting in the 1990s, leading commentators, lawyers, and activists deemphasized 
the language of choice, relying instead on a reproductive-justice framework. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, as this section argues, women of color raised new 
questions about the rights framework that had long dominated the work of the pro-
choice movement. In 1994, after returning from the Cairo Conference on 
International Population and Development, a caucus of African-American women 
took inspiration from the comprehensive vision of reproductive health set forth in 
international human rights law.242 The 1994 Cairo Programme of Action had 
defined reproductive health as a human right, exposing the gap between pro-choice 
rhetoric at home and the bolder agenda promoted abroad.243 At a meeting of the 
Illinois Pro-Choice Alliance in Chicago, a group of African-American women 
coined the term reproductive justice to describe the vision they identified with 
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international human rights law.244 The idea of reproductive justice wove in familiar 
attacks on the idea of choice, noting that poor and often non-white women lacked 
the support and resources to control their own reproductive lives.245 As Loretta 
Ross explained, choice-centered rhetoric “masked the ways that laws, policies and 
public officials punish or reward the reproductive activity of different groups of 
women differently.”246 
The idea of reproductive justice reflected the work of established 
organizations like the National Black Women’s Health Project (founded in 1984) 
and the National Latina Health Organization (founded in 1986), many of which 
raised concerns about a choice-centered framework in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.247 After the mid-1990s, new groups like the SisterSong Women of Color 
Reproductive Health Collective formed to champion the idea of reproductive 
justice.248 To be sure, the push for reproductive justice in the mid-1990s bore some 
fruit. Both NARAL and Planned Parenthood adopted broader reform agendas, and 
the National Organization of Women (NOW) made welfare rights a priority.249  
After 2010, mainstream organizations themselves adopted the rhetoric and 
reasoning of reproductive justice. Beginning in 2011, frustrated at its inability to 
reach younger women, Planned Parenthood conducted polling and focus groups 
that revealed that a choice-centered message did not capture the range of issues, 
including health care, insurance coverage, pay equity, and birth control coverage, 
motivating many voters.250 In the 2014 election season, Planned Parenthood 
responded by setting aside the rhetoric of choice, searching for arguments that 
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resonated with more women and opening the door to a more in-depth discussion of 
reproductive justice.251  
As early as 2004, NOW’s national conference featured sessions on 
reproductive justice.252 By 2014, the organization campaigned not only against 
abortion restrictions but also against limits on contraceptive access.253 As the 
organization’s materials explained: “NOW affirms that reproductive rights are 
issues of life and death for women, not mere matters of choice.”254  
Nor has interest in reproductive justice been limited to grassroots activists and 
attorneys; scholars have also developed a rich theoretical framework to elaborate 
on the ideas and experiences of grassroots champions of reproductive justice.255 
Defined by the work of legal commentators like Dorothy Roberts and Robin West 
and historians like Rickie Solinger, the new theory of reproductive justice makes a 
compelling case for a more comprehensive approach to reproductive health.256 
In the context of assisted reproduction, a disability-rights critique has 
influenced scholars’ approach to disability-based abortion and other reproductive 
issues.257 In the political arena, by contrast, disability-based arguments for abortion 
remain a visible and important part of debate. Why has this gap developed? From 
the beginning of the movement for abortion reform, disability-based justifications 
for abortion enjoyed significant public support. When pro-life activists seem to 
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have the upper hand, it is tempting to fall back on the “hard cases” that many 
Americans see as justification for abortion, including those involving fetal 
defects.258 However, as attitudes about disability shift, the short-term benefit 
gained by using these arguments contrasts sharply with their potential long-term 
costs. 
First, by steering debate to disability-based abortions, pro-life politicians and 
activists can more effectively question the value of the reproductive-justice 
approach that mainstream pro-choice groups have started to embrace. A 
reproductive-justice framework calls on supporters of legal abortion to go “beyond 
a demand for privacy and respect for individual decision making to include the 
social supports necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally realized.”259 
Relatedly, reproductive justice activists seek to rectify “the isolation of abortion 
from other social justice issues.”260 With respect to many reproductive-health 
issues, groups like NOW and NARAL have adopted some of the logic associated 
with a reproductive-justice framework.261 This move has important legal and 
political consequences—allowing supporters of legal abortion to speak more 
effectively to the concerns of women of color, to build cross-movement alliances, 
and to develop a more comprehensive agenda.  
Conventional disability-based justifications for abortion fit poorly in the 
reproductive-justice framework. First, presenting disability as an obvious reason to 
pursue abortion creates tensions between the pro-choice movement and potential 
allies in the disability-rights movement. As importantly, the use of disability as a 
justification for abortion stands in stark contrast to the reproductive-justice 
commitment to changing the conditions in which women make choices. A wide 
array of factors contributes to certain decisions about disability and abortion, 
including a lack of governmental assistance, ignorance about the prognosis for 
disabled children, and concern about the discrimination or stigma attached to 
disability. By simply falling back on the assumption that disability-based abortions 
are justifiable, pro-choice activists miss an important opportunity.  
More concretely, the disability-based arguments refined in the fight for Down 
Syndrome bans have already contributed to the success of new abortion restrictions 
and will likely do the same in the future. In Congress and certain states, the 
antiabortion movement has committed to the introduction of bans on abortion after 
the 20th week of pregnancy.262 Eleven states have already passed such a ban, as 
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did the House of Representatives in January 2015.263 In demanding these bans, 
pro-life politicians and activists have highlighted the fact that a significant number 
of late-term abortions occur because of a diagnosis of fetal abnormality. 
Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), one of the leading proponents 
of a twenty-week ban in the House, framed the bill partly as a remedy for disability 
discrimination, emphasizing the experience of her own son with Down 
Syndrome.264 In Ohio, activists connected a proposed 20-week ban with the Down 
Syndrome prohibition by emphasizing that many women who terminated a 
pregnancy after the first trimester did so because of a fetal abnormality.265  
Assuming that the Court maintains viability as a dividing line, 20-week bans 
will likely be found to create an undue burden under Casey. Although the precise 
definition of viability is contested and fluid, a 20-week ban clearly would outlaw at 
least some pre-viability abortions.266 Even though Whole Woman’s Health made 
the undue-burden test more meaningful, the Court went out of its way to 
emphasize that its decision did not conflict with Carhart, a decision that 
emphasized that D&X is performed late in pregnancy in justifying a federal ban on 
the procedure.267 In the near future, pro-life groups plan to target later term 
abortions, seeing these procedures as vulnerable notwithstanding the outcome of 
Whole Woman’s Health.268 Effectively combatting 20-week bans will require a 
more nuanced response to the issue of disability and abortion. While affirming that 
women should have the ultimate decision about whether to terminate a pregnancy, 
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those fighting 20-week bans should explore solutions that would make abortions 
on the basis of disability less likely. 
The new focus on disability and abortion may also fuel new regulation of 
prenatal testing. As Jaime Staples King has argued, limiting access to prenatal 
diagnostic tools may accomplish what disability-based bans could not—limiting 
the number of disability-based abortions.269 As is often the case with assisted 
reproduction and other new technologies, it is far from clear how the courts would 
resolve constitutional questions about restrictions on access to noninvasive 
prenatal genetic diagnosis.270 Politically, it will be difficult for supporters of 
reproductive justice to fend off restrictions on these technologies by continuing to 
reflexively treat disability as a reason for abortion. The disability-rights movement 
and its allies have complicated discussion of the issue in a way that would make 
the arguments often used in the abortion dialogue a strategic liability.  
What would a better response to the new disability-based bans involve? The 
following section of this Article considers several proposals that should be 
incorporated into a reproductive-justice agenda. 
 
B.  Disability Discrimination and the Preconditions for Reproductive Choice 
 
By definition, a reproductive-justice agenda includes an effort to change the 
conditions that push women to make some choices while putting others out of 
reach. What are some of those conditions in the context of disability? To be sure, 
the disability-rights movement has already changed the legal climate in significant 
ways.271 Nevertheless, significant barriers remain that might influence potential 
parents considering abortion. Notwithstanding the introduction of the ADA, only 
one in five disabled Americans is employed.272 The poverty rate for disabled 
Americans continues to be far higher than other groups, rising to roughly 32% in 
2013 when only 11% of Americans without a work limitation fell below the 
poverty line.273 Knowing that disabled children may struggle to live independently, 
potential parents may hesitate to bring a pregnancy to term. 
To change the conditions in which women consider the issue of disability, 
supporters of reproductive justice should call for adequate support of disabled 
children and adults under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)274 and Social 
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Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) programs.275 At present, disabled children 
under age 18 may receive SSI benefits, whereas adults with a disability that began 
before age 22 may receive SSDI benefits.276 At a time when structural and cultural 
barriers limit the employment opportunities of disabled Americans, a reproductive-
justice agenda should involve calls for adequate annual funding under both 
programs, as well as under Medicaid. Parents deciding about disability and 
abortion would have a more meaningful choice if they knew that the government 
would provide more meaningful financial support. 
A reproductive-justice agenda should also include a commitment to removing 
some of the barriers that deny employment and financial security to disabled 
individuals with the capacity to work. The ADA already prohibits disability 
discrimination and mandates the reasonable accommodation of disability in the 
workplace.277 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires that the 
government provide all disabled children a “free appropriate public education.”278 
More recently, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act provides expanded 
access to training, education, and vocational rehabilitation for disabled individuals 
transitioning from school to work.279 Finally, Congress acted in 2014 to pass the 
Achieving Better Life Experience Act (ABLE Act), which allows disabled 
individuals to save up to $14,000 in a tax-free account without jeopardizing 
existing federal benefits.280 
However, the causes of unemployment and poverty among the disabled are 
far more complex. Some of the obstacles to employment for disabled Americans 
stem from the inadequate funding of existing programs. Because of inadequate 
funding for transportation initiatives like the Section 5310 transportation for 
elderly persons and persons with disabilities program,281 many disabled Americans 
face multi-hour commutes that prevent some individuals from taking certain 
jobs.282 Disabled workers may have to take medical leave more often than their 
counterparts without a work limitation. Although the federal Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) allows for 3 months of unpaid leave for qualifying workers, 
not all disabled workers are covered by the Act, including those employed at 
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smaller businesses or in part-time positions.283 Even those covered by the FMLA 
may not be able to afford to take unpaid leave.284 
A program of paid medical leave or a dramatic increase in transportation 
funding may seem politically impossible at the time of this writing. Moreover, 
employers refrain from hiring disabled individuals partly because of the perceived 
added costs of doing so, including the price of accommodations mandated by the 
ADA and FMLA.285 Adding a paid leave requirement might deter more employers 
from hiring disabled workers in the first place. 
At a minimum, even if more ambitious reforms seem out of reach, a 
reproductive-justice agenda should include reasonable legislative steps that will 
make it easier for disabled workers who can achieve economic independence to do 
so. First, notwithstanding the introduction of the ABLE Act, other federal 
programs discourage the kind of saving that helps workers climb out of poverty. 
For example, under SSI, recipients have a $2,000 resource or asset limit for 
eligible individuals and a $3,000 limit for couples.286 Since 1972, when Congress 
first introduced the SSI program, the asset limitation has not kept up with 
inflation—estimates of an adjusted asset limit would be more than four times 
higher than those that currently apply.287 At present, disabled individuals face a 
perverse incentive—any additional income or resources above the asset limit may 
jeopardize the receipt of SSI benefits. Supporters of reproductive justice should 
join other groups asking for an updating of SSI limits that will allow for more 
saving and investment by disabled individuals without penalty. 
Similarly, many disabled workers require attendant services to achieve 
independence at home and at work. Most personal insurance policies do not cover 
these services. For those who do not qualify for Medicaid, attendant services and 
employment may be out of reach. Section 201 of the Ticket to Work and 
Workplace Incentive Act creates a state-based, optional Medicaid buy-in program 
for disabled individuals who would not otherwise be eligible for Medicaid, and a 
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similar buy-in program operates under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.288 At 
present, 46 states and the District of Columbia administer a Medicaid buy-in 
(MBI) program.289  
In practice, however, many states apply strict eligibility limits and limit 
available services in a way that make buy-in programs useless to certain disabled 
workers. In Texas, for example, disabled workers cannot make more than $2,475 
per month to qualify for a buy-in program.290 The program does not cover 
attendant services that some workers need to pursue meaningful employment.291 A 
reproductive-justice agenda should include the campaign for a federal MBI law 
that would set minimum service and eligibility requirements to create meaningful 
access to needed services. 
Finally, a reproductive-justice agenda should include an effort to continue to 
remove the stigma that discourages employers from hiring disabled adults and 
decreases the odds that parents will bring a pregnancy to term in cases of 
disability. In economic terms, because of concerns that workers are not up to the 
task or worry that accommodations will cost too much, employers still seem 
reluctant to hire adults with disabilities. As Samuel Bagenstos has argued, the 
stigma surrounding disability stems from “the legacy of a history of exclusion and 
reflects a series of broader ideological developments.”292 The argumentative 
strategy used by supporters of legal abortion should not rely on the stigma 
surrounding disability. Instead, in explaining the reasons some parents choose 
abortion in cases of disability, supporters of reproductive justice should do more to 
challenge the inaccurate and politically charged stereotypes surrounding disability. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
While the disability politics of abortion seem to be a new feature of the 
political terrain, the issue has a long history that shapes the legal opportunities 
available today to those on either side of the abortion debate. Starting in the 1960s, 
a diagnosis of fetal disability has served as a core justification for access to legal 
abortion. Activists used disability first as an exception to sweeping bans on the 
intentional termination of pregnancy. Over time, as demand for the repeal of all 
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abortion restrictions intensified, arguments about fetal disability played a central 
role in efforts to counter the impact of new arguments raised by the pro-life 
movement.  
After Roe, while pro-life activists raised concern about a slippery slope that 
would threaten all disabled, elderly, and dependent Americans, pro-choice activists 
continued turning to disability-based justifications when defending controversial 
policies, including access to late-term abortion. Recently, as the disability-rights 
movement has built political influence, pro-life activists have put more emphasis 
on the issue of discrimination against the handicapped. Abortion opponents use 
these arguments to justify motive-based abortion bans as well as prohibitions on 
late-term abortions. 
This history helps explain a strange disconnect between the disability politics 
of abortion and a broader reproductive justice agenda. Because disability-based 
justifications consistently enjoyed popular support, pro-choice activists in the 
political arena strategically deploy such arguments when access to reproductive 
health services comes under fire. 
Increasingly, these short-term gains will come at a substantial cost. The 
disability-based bans considered in Ohio and Indiana may not themselves make a 
significant difference to abortion access. Constitutionally dubious and 
unenforceable in practical terms, these bans will not do much to stop the abortions 
targeted by statute. Nevertheless, the disability-discrimination arguments made in 
support of such bans may resonate with legal and political audiences not usually 
receptive to antiabortion rhetoric. Such claims have already fueled the push for 
bans on abortion after the 20th week of pregnancy and may serve in new 
campaigns to limit access to noninvasive prenatal diagnostic technologies or to ban 
abortion following a Zika diagnosis. 
To avoid these political traps, a meaningful reproductive-justice approach 
should play down justifications for abortion based on disability. Instead, those 
supporting access to legal abortion should take on some of the legal obstacles that 
make it harder for parents to choose to bear and raise disabled children. Tackling 
these obstacles, and encouraging legislators and judges to be more attentive to 
them, can create a disability politics of abortion that accords with the value 
supposedly endorsed by those on either side of the abortion question—the goal of 
expanding equal treatment for those traditionally left behind in American politics. 
